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Introduction 
Equality is an elusive concept. Celeste Condit and John Louis Lucaites write 
that equality 'is at once a normative abstraction that resonates with the 
highest ideals of America's collective being, and a rather narrow and 
pedestrian, empirical characterisation of the sameness or identity of any two 
objects' (Condit and Lucaites, 1993: ix). In the United States the concept of 
equality is unstable and relatively indeterminate. 'The language of equality 
is rhetorical cover under which political claims are advanced and contested; 
hut it very seldom captures the substance of those political claims' (Waldron, 
I 991: 1:35 I). Therefore, some argue, the rhetoric of equality has no sub-
stantive content (Westen, 1982). Nevertheless, the rhetoric and public 
discourse surrounding discussions of equality influence legal interpretations 
of what constitutes compensatory justice. 
Given the indeterminacy of law, it is unsurprising that there are 
competing visions of equality in the United States today. The controversy 
in the U niLed States over what constitutes equality for blacks or African 
Americans' and other 'racial minorities'' is one site of this debate. In fact, 
much of the current public discourse on affirmative action for example 
' ' centres around the meaning of equality. Affirmative action is seen by 
proponents as a means to achieving a racially just society. Opponents argue, 
however, that alll.rmative action undermines equality between racialised 
groups because race can be used as a decision-making factor. This essay 
adopts the more cynical view advanced by some critical scholars, namely 
that affirmative action programs and anti-discrimination law in general are 
not designed to achieve a racially just society. 
Anti-discrimination law leaves intact those-institutions and structures 
that support racial subordination because the dominant powers are 
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unwilling to support an interpretation of legal doctrine that will achieve a 
racially just society (Freeman, 1978; Crenshaw, 1989). The dominant powers 
construct and interpret anti-discrimination law from the perspective of the 
perpetrator of discrimination as opposed to the person discriminated 
against. As a result, plaintiffs in discrimination suits find it difficult to 
establish actionable discrimination in all but the most flagrant situations 
(Freeman, 1978; Lawrence, 1987). Successful legal strategies are short lived 
as courts invoke equality on behalf of white plaintiffs who advance racial 
discrimination claims, thereby undermining the usefulness of these 
strategies for non-white plaintiffs. 
This pattern is apparent from a briefreview of Supreme Court race and 
gender equal protection cases. Given this reality, the development of any 
theory for racial justice in the United States must be a continuous 
evolutionary process. Advocates for racial justice must continue to develop 
new theories of equality as racial conservatives undermine current legal 
theories. 
Equal Protection of the Laws 
There was no specific guarantee of equality in the US Constitution until the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, almost a century after 
the Declaration of Independence. Section 1 of that amendment provides that 
'No State shall . . . deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws'. This amendment only applies to State action, hut in 
1954 the United States Supreme Court read a similar guarantee into the 
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment which applies to the federal 
government (Bolling v Sharpe, 1954). 
This constitutional guarantee of equal protection ofthe laws, however, 
is problematic. First, the equal protection guarantee applies only to 
government (public) not private actors. 1 This public-private distinction 
ignores the role private individuals and entities play in thwarting one's 
ability to realise equality before the law. Second, even the Supreme Court 
admits that equal protection of the laws, like equality, 'is susceptible of 
varying interpretations' (Bakke v Regents of the University of California, 
1978: 284). Thus, the measure of equality, or determination of sameness or 
identity, depends on who is doing the defining as well as the historical 
context of the equality claim. 
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Since anti-discrimination law views discrimination from the perspective 
of a perpetrator rather than that of the victim, equality is defined very 
narrowly. In the 19th century, for example, the United States Supreme 
Court upheld State laws mandating separation of the races in almost every 
walk of life, reasoning that de jure racial segregation did not connote 
inequality under the law (Plessy v Ferguson, 1896). The court also upheld 
lmv::-, denying equal rights to women, reasoning that '[c]ivillaw, as well as 
nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective 
iiphcres and destinies of men and women' (Bradwell v Illinois, 1873: 141, 
Brady concurring). 
These decisions do not reflect the perspectives of the petitioners, blacks 
and white women, but rather reinforce explicit political decisions about 
which groups should be considered full participants in US society. Over time 
just what constitutes equal protection under the laws, in the eyes of the 
perpetrators, abo changed. The court outlawed government mandated racial 
segregation (Brown u Board of Education, 1954) and now applies a 
hPightened level of judicial scrutiny to government actions that disad-
vantage women (Fronterio u Richardson, 1973). 
Dy the late 20th century court decisions and legislation reflected public 
consensus that laws should apply to all 'equally', including racial minorities 
and white women. Problems immediately arose over the contemporary 
meaning of the equal protection guarantee, and how to achieve this equality 
in a country with a long history of racml and gender subordination. The 
dt'batl' centered on what constituted 'legal equality' and whether compen-
satory measures were necessary to this equality for white women and non-
whit<"s or communities of colour.' 
For blacks the legacy of slavery and de jure racial segregation made 
simpl.v removing legally sanctioned racial barriers, as the court did in 
Bn,wn v Board of Education, insufficient to achieve parity with whites. 
Following Brown some whites continued to resist efforts to desegregate. 
Even where there was no overt resistance, structural barriers growing out 
of the systematic exclusion of blacks from various areas of public life 
resulted in de f'acto rather than de jure racial exclusion. Similar barriers 
existt'd for all women arising from centuries of legalised gender subor-
dination. Compensatory or affirmative measures were needed, but the 
dominant powers' narrow construction of the equal protection guarantee 
substantially limited the use of the doctrine to secure racial justice. 
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Formal Equality 
There are two primary competing visions of legal equality in the United 
States. The dominant powers construct equal protection of the laws to mean 
equal treatment, or formal equality, and critical scholars a~d anti-r.acialist 
argue that equal protection means equal results or suhstantwe equabLy. The 
discourse of formal equality is further controlled because the courts 
determine who are similarly situated parties for comparison purposes and 
require claimants to prove the perpetrator intended to discrimination. 
Similarly situated parties 
Given the extent of human difference, courts must determine which 
differences among individuals or groups justify treating them differently. 
The Supreme Court uses the formal equality approach, interpreting the 
equal protection guarantee to require that government treat all similarly 
situated persons 'equally' (Tussman and TenBroek, 1949). The deter-
mination of who is similarly situated usually dictates the outcome of an 
inequality claim. Much of the debate about gender equality, for example, 
centers on whether women are similarly situated to men. Women often 
receive unequal treatment because males are the model against which 
notions of equality are measured. Historically, the court drew distinctions 
based on alleged differences between women and men that were matters of 
'natural destiny' (Bradwell, 1873). In theory, the formal equality approach 
adopted by the contemporary Supreme Court rejects any notion of'natural 
destiny'. Yet debate still arises over whether biological differencPs between 
women and men should be considered in determining what constitutes equal 
protection of the laws. If men are the standard used for measuring equality 
claims then, under the Constitution, biological differences between women 
and men can be used by employers and others to disadvantage women. 
In Geduldig v Aiello (1974) for example, the Supreme Court held that a 
State disability insurance plan which covered all short-term disabilities 
except pregnancy did not necessarily constitute sex discrimination under the 
equal protection clause. Discrimination based on pregnancy did not involve 
gender, according to the all-male court, because women were covered for the 
same risks as men and vice versa. The court reasoned that since 'only 
women become pregnant' and the plan only discriminated against 'some 
women' - those who are pregnant - and not all women, there was no 
unlawful gender discrimination. In Geduldig u Aiello (1974) women suffered 
because they were treated the same as men in a situation where clear 
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biological ditl'erenc(•s between the two dictated a different result to achieve 
meaningful equality. 
Enm though the equal protection guarantee seems to exempt biological 
differences between women and men, courts still must determine whether 
some asserted biological gender differences really are social constructs or 
'natural destiny' justifications which should not be allowed to defeat gender 
discrimination claims. Many of the early equal protection gender cases 
decided by the Supreme Court focused on socially constructed differences 
framt~d as 'natural' or dictated by biology. In these cases women challenged 
n·striction,; on their entry into certain spheres based on alleged 'natural' 
difference, unchallenged presumptions about women's abilities to perform 
certain tasks (Muller l' Ore!{on, 190R; Goesaert u Clearly, 1948; Hoyt u 
Florida, 1961 ). 
Today, the court considers most restrictions that disadvantage women 
based on their alleged 'natural' differences to be pretexts for unlawful 
gendPr discrimination. Even so, there are situations where the court's 
construction of who is similarly situated preserves what appear to be 
socially constructed practice:=; that perpetuate gender discrimination. For 
example, in Michael M u Superior Court (19tH) the court upheld a State 
statutory rape law which punished men, but not women, who engaged in sex 
with mmurs, reasoning that the statute protected an important State 
interest, prevention of "illegitimate pregnancies'. Three dissenting judges 
belit'ved that the law was based on 'sexual stereotypes'. If prevention of 
pregnancies outside marriage was the real concern, then adult women who 
have Sf'xual intercourse with minor males also should be punished. A better 
explanation is that the outcome in Michael M simply represents . a 
paternalistic perpetrator-focused effort to suppress adolescent women's 
sexuality while implicitedly condoning the sexual activity of adolescent men. 
The :=;anw year in Rostkcr u Goldberg (1981) the court upheld a federal law 
exempting women from registt,ring for the military draft reasoning that 
women and men were not similarly situated because only men were eligible 
for combat roles, an essential reason for the draft requirement- As the three 
dissenters pointed out, however, the government never established that 
there was either a need to draft only combat troops or draft men for both 
combat and non-combat positions while exempting women. Arguably, the 
statute simply perpetuated a governmental perpetrator-based preference for 
an all-male military, since neither the majority nor the dissenters 
questioned the decision to have male only combat troops. 
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The petitioners in both Michael M and Rostker were men who 
unsuccessfully challenged gender specific statutes they claimed 
disadvantaged men. As these cases suggest, formal equality also dictates 
equal treatment in reverse discrimination suits, where laws allegedly 
disadvantage men. The fact that law traditionally operated to disadvantage 
women and not men often gets lost in the court's analysis, but this result is 
not unexpected when the legal doctrine adopts a perpetrator as opposed to 
a victim perspective. 
The equal treatment approach dictated by formal equality disco~rages 
affirmative gender-conscious efforts to counter the effects of women's long 
history of subordination by men. Women's colleges developed in the United 
States because historically women were denied access to higher educatwn. 
Yet in Mississippi College for Women u Hogan (1982: 729) the court ordered 
a State-funded all women's nursing school to admit male applicants. ,Justice 
Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the majority, said that 'rather than 
compensate for discriminatory barriers faced by women, MUW's policy of 
excluding males from admission to the school of nursing tends to perpetuate 
the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job'. 
Some feminist and critical scholars questioned the court's assumption 
that a man excluded from an all-women's institution created to compensate 
for the exclusion of women from higher educational institutions was 
similarly situated. Unlike women in earlier years, the male claimant in 
Hogan was not totally excluded from publicly funded nursing traini~g. Ye~ 
the court treated Hogan's exclusion from the nursing program at MissiSSippi 
College for Women as discrimination, even though nursing training was 
available at other State-supported universities. The Hogan 'reverse 
discrimination' decision shows how anti-discrimination laws can be co-opted 
by the very perpetrators of the discrimination. 
The decision in Hogan left unclear whether publicly funded sex 
segregated colleges or universities are ever permissible under_ the equal 
protection clause. The court's most recent decision in this area still does not 
clearly answer this question. In United States u Virginia (1996) the c~u:t 
ordered the State to admit women to the all-male publicly funded VIrgima 
Military Institute (VMI). The State argued unsuccessfully that all-male 
military education especially benefited men and furthered educatwn~l 
diversity in the State. The Supreme Court rejected Virginia's claim, but dtd 
not squarely address whether publicly funded single sex coll~ges and 
universities are ever permissible under the equal protection clause.· Instead, 
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the. court concluded that the State had not established its claim that men 
denved some special educational benefit from VMI' t · · 
. . s rammg program to 
JUStJ(y a male-only policy, and had not provide women with substantially 
equal educatwnal opportunities. 
~orne may see United States v Virginia as the flip side of Hogan, but in 
reahty both threaten, not reinforce the quest for social justice. Both 
dec1s10ns preserve an overall institutional structure that favours men 
t~en~hy t.r~ating women like men. Meaningful social justice for women rna; 
d1ctate chfterent paths for women and men. 
Intent tu discrinunate 
A Sh·ond problen~ that arises under the legal regime of 'formal equality' is 
t ~e T~ef:d for cl3Imants to establish an intent to discriminate in race 
<hscnmmatwn claims. Often this requirement poses an insurmountable 
b~rner. when the challenged provision is neutral on its face. but has a 
dJscnmlllatory impact. In Washington u Davis (1976) the plaintiffs 
estabhshed that a written objective test used in the selection of police 
officers had a du;proportionate impact on black applicants. They argued that 
the test, although neutral on its face and applied evenhandedly discrim·-d . ' I 
nate. on the basis of race because its use imposed greater burdens on black 
apphcants than white applicants. The Supreme Court found that proof of 
the racwlly. d1s~roportionate effect of the test did not signal an equal 
protectiOn vwlatwn because the litigants could not prove that the test was 
adopted with the specific intent or purpose to exclude blacks from the police 
force. Thus. the continued use by the local government of a test where 
whites disproportionately out-performed blacks was insufficient under 
current equal protection jurisprudence to raise even a presumption of 
un~awful race discrimination in the absence of any overtly intentional racial 
an1mus. 
. Charles Lawrence argues that the result in Washington v Davis is 
unJust because the court ignores unconsciously motivated racial discrimi-
nation. ~his 'unconscious racism', he says, stems from a shared history and 
cult~re mfluenced by racism which often induces negative feelings and 
opmwns about non-whites. These feelings and opinions often influence the 
behaviour of whites resulting in unintentional racial discrimination 
(Lawrence, 19R7 ). Since there is no overt racial animus or invidious intent 
to discriminate, the formal equality approach to equal protection denies the 
existence of a legally cognisable race discrimination claim. 
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Lawrence writes that '[t]he intent requirement also disregards how 
overtly racist practices and laws of the past have become entrenched in 
institutions of white privilege that do not require new racist intent for their 
maintenance' (Lawrence and Matsuda, 1997: 78). For example, in Dauis the 
court never questions whether education in substandard schools might be 
one reason why so many black applicants scored lower than their white 
counterparts. Thus, black applicants who already had been denied an equal 
chance to learn were further penalised by the use of a test that in effect 
perpetuated an educational advantage gained by whites as a result of recent 
racism (Lawrence and Matsuda, 1997: 78). 
The intent requirement in equal protection jurisprudence allows courts 
to ignore connections between the country's history of slavery and de jure 
segregation and the current unequal position of blacks and other non-
whites. The requirement of an intent to discriminate permits the un-
conscious racism embodied in the policies and practices of employers and 
educational institutions to go unexamined and unchallenged in the courts. 
So racial conservatives can attribute the continuing economic and edu-
cational disparity between blacks, most non-whites and whites to internal 
problems within these communities. 6 As a result, many conservatives assert 
that racial discrimination no longer exists today, and now the laws should 
be 'colourblind'. 
Increasingly, some members of the court agree. Justice Scalia wrote in 
Adarand Constructors Inc v Pena (1995: 2118, Scalia concurring), that 
'under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a 
debtor race ... To pursue the concept of racial entitlement - even for the 
most admirable and benign of purposes - is to reinforce and preserve for 
future mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race 
privilege and race hatred'. Charles Lawrence and Mari Matsuda (1997: RO) 
call the arguments in support of colourblindness the 'big lie'. They and other 
critical race scholars argue that affirmative action or compensatory 
measures are the minimum needed for blacks and other non-whites to have 
meaningful equal opportunity. Whether these compensatory measures are 
short term as opposed to long term depends also upon one's vision of 
equality. The answer also goes to the heart of the debate over affirmative 
action. 
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Mfirmative Action 
~rmative action usually consists of'public or private actions or programs 
whi_ch provide or seek to provide opportunities or benefits to persons on the 
basis of, among other things, their membership in a specific group or groups' 
(Jones, 19R5: 903). The traditional rationale for most forms of affirmative 
action is redress for past racial or gender injustice. Early affirmative efforts 
simply meant establishing positive policies of non-discrimination on the 
basis of race. In addition to prohibiting the exclusion of blacks from jobs, 
early affirmative action programs included recruitment efforts designed to 
attract blacks into certain jobs. The rationale for these affirmative efforts 
~as not some moral imperative, but rather that a racially integrated work-
force was m the nation's economic interest (Jones, 1988: 903). When these 
early affirmative action measures proved ineffective, President Johnson 
issued an executive order in 1964 that compelled certain government 
c~n.tractors to make race a factor in employment decisions by establishing 
h1rmg goals for minorities.' 
In the mid-1960s Congress also enacted anti-discrimination laws to 
combat employment discrimination. Mter finding that periodic compliance 
revww and employment reports were ineffective means to integrate the 
work forces of government contractors, the Nixon administration developed 
the Philadelphia Plan relying on hiring goals and timetables (Jones, 1988). 
Use of these measures spread from government contractors to public and 
private employers and institutions of higher learning. 
Of course, these affirmative actions measures were not welcomed by all. 
In addition to some whites who were resistant to racial integration, some 
activists within the black community regarded these affirmative efforts as 
~osmetic and inadequate because they lacked mechanisms for community 
~n-put or control of decision making. 'The affirmative action programs put 
m place met the needs of the institutions that created them' (Lawrence and 
Matsuda, 1997: 25). 
Proponents of affirmative action argued that compensatory race and 
gender conscious policies are needed to redress past government-sanctioned 
discrimination and provide greater access to opportunities routinely denied 
non-whites and white women in the past as a result of societal 
discrimination. In addition, some argue that race conscious measures are 
necessary to achieve a diverse workforce and enrich the educational 
environment, a point addressed more fully in the next section. Promotion of 
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racial integration does not, however, necessarily result in a racially just 
society. 
Voluntarv affirmative action efforts are the most controversial and most 
susceptible to fail under traditional equal protection analysis. Voluntary 
compensatory measures include racial preferences, preferring members of 
a racially subordinated group over white applicants or preferring women 
over men when making hiring or admissions decisions. This racial or gender 
preference, however, does not operate as a total bar for white or male 
applicants. The preferences simply improve, slightly, the chances for women 
and non-white applicants, rather than fully compensate for existing 
structural inequalities. Preferences are token measures because they 
require the 'outsider' white woman or non-white applicant to adapt to 
existing structures rather than require the dismantling of these 
exclusionary structures. 
The Supreme Court and challenges to affirmative action 
A divided Supreme Court has reviewed challenges to affirmative action 
efforts. In Bakke ( 1978) one of the earliest challenges to reach the court, a 
plurality agreed that the UC-Davis Medical School admissions program 
reserving seats for minority applicants was unconstitutional, but they could 
not agree on the level of scrutiny required when reviewing (benign) race-
conscious affirmative action policies. Justice Powell, for example, said that 
race could be used as a factor when making admissions decisions to ensure 
'diversity' among entering university students. Two years later in Fullilrnw 
v Klutznick (1980) the court upheld a federal program requiring that 10 per 
cent of all federal funds awarded to contractors for State and local building 
projects be spend on goods and services provided by minority business 
enterprises, saying that the program survived both intermediate and strict 
scrutiny reviews (472-8). Four years later in Wygant v Jackson Board of 
Education (1986) another plurality struck down a local school board policy 
that attempted to preserve the jobs of minority teachers when making layoff 
decisions. 
By 1989 the Supreme Court, turning a blind eye to the legacy of racial 
discrimination against blacks, issued several rulings that subjected 
government-sanctioned remedial or benign race-conscious measures to as 
stringent a review as invidious discrimination claims. A plurality in City of 
Richmond v Croson (1989) resolved the uncertainty about the standard of 
review for benign race conscious measures raised in Bakke, applying strict 
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scrutmy in striking down a city-initiated affirmative action set-aside 
program designed to remedy past discrimination. The next year the court 
in Metro Broadcasting u Federal Communications Commission (1990) 
applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to a federally-sponsored race and 
gender conscious program. This distinction between benign federal and 
State programs was short lived. Five years after Metro Broadcasting the 
court in Adarand Constructors v Pena (1990) reversed itself holding that 
'[fled era! racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling 
governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that 
interest' (2117). 
With the exception of Bakke, all of these Supreme Court cases focused 
on affirmative action efforts in employment. To date the court has resisted 
efforts by racial conservatives to examine benign race conscious measures 
by colleges and universities. In 1996, for example, the court declined to 
review the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood u Texas, applying a strict 
scrul iny standard of review to strike down a benign race-conscious 
admissions program instituted by the University of Texas Law School. A 
year earlier the court also declined to review an analogous Fourth Circuit 
deci6ion, Podberesky u Kirwan (1995) striking down a race-based scholarship 
program designed to remedy past and continuing discrimination at the 
University of Maryland. The court's refusal to hear either Hopwood or 
Pudbercsky leaves unresolved whether the Croson strict scrutiny standard 
applies to higher education cases and whether the diversity rationale 
advanced by Justice Powell in Bakke remains good law. 
Some see these recent affirmative action decisions as signalling the 
death of affirmative action in the United States. Others argue that 
affirmative action needs to be restructured, substituting preferences based 
on class for racial preference (Kahlenberg, 1996: 728). Still others argue for 
expansion of race and gender preferences for diversity purposes, a point 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
Public rf'action to affirmatil•e action 
Over the years, public support for voluntary affirmative action, while never 
strong, has eroded. Critics argue that race conscious efforts increase rather 
than minimise racial antagonism. Affirmative action, these critics claim, 
undermines the nation's Puritan work ethos which supports individual 
achievement or merit over birthright (Morrison, 1994: 354-5). Interestingly, 
criticism focuses on race-based rather than gender-based affirmative action 
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when in fact white women have been the primary beneficiaries of 
affirmative action efforts.' Yet, white women have not been vocal in the 
current debates over the future of affirmative action in the United States. 
The reasons for the relative silence of white women are not entirely 
clear. Some women may believe that they no longer need affirmative action, 
and others may resist tying gender-based affirmative action to race-based 
affirmative action, believing that the public is more supportive of the former 
than the latter. A more cynical view is that many white women see non-
white women and men as competitors, and retain or adopt notions of white 
superiority thereby rejecting calls for an anti-racist approach to 
discrimination. 
White women still run the risk of being measured by male standards 
applied from the perspective of powerful men. They still experience 
discrimination. Sexual harassment remains a problem in the workplace. 
Women also continue to be under represented in the higher echelons of the 
private and public workforce. They also continue to make less money than 
men with comparable credentials (Lawrence and Matsuda, 1997: lf>3-5). 
Opponents of affirmative action characterise these efforts as mandating 
racial preferences which they argue are inherently unjust to whites and 
inconsistent with notions of equal protection. Affirmative action opponents 
either deny responsibility for past or continuing discrimination or assume, 
disingenuously, that racism has ended. Thus, they argue, whites, especially 
white men are 'victimised' by compensatory measures aimed at racially 
subordinated groups. This narrow vision of equality focuses on individual 
experiences, which may vary with a variety of factors such as a person's 
race, class, age, gender, and location. According to Alan Freeman (1978: 
1053), this approach to discrimination is the consequence of 'anti-
discrimination law [that] is hopelessly embedded in the perpetrator 
perspective ... [and is] ultimately indifferent to the conduction of the victim'. 
An individualistic approach to equality makes it difficult to attack 
structural or systemic discrimination, resulting in piecemeal litigation 
which relies primarily on each individual victim of discrimination. This 
focus on individualism ignores reality. Discriminatory measures are based 
on group membership, not individual traits, and the protection of blacks as 
a group is consistent with the purpose behind the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee (Fried, l990: 109-
10). In addition, giving racially subordinated groups preference in 
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employment. government contracts and university admissicns IS not 
mconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of equality. 
Racial preferences and the Constitution 
The_ equal protection clause does not clearly outlaw benign racial 
prefere~ces. Alexander Bickel (1955) argues that the purpose of the equal 
protectwn clause was to guarantee blacks equality with whites for those 
rights deemed necessary incidents of their status as free persons. During 
the 19th century: 
Racial dil10rpnces were pern,ived as fundamental, enduring and, almost 
always, rd1c>ctmg the mnatc> superiority of the whit£' population .... The idea 
that hlack andwhite arc equal, that race> is not a meaningful category, did 
not ~t'~'ln to gam ascendancy until well into the present century' (Sandalow, 
1970: 1164). 
Involuntary characteristics like skin color or sex have 'frequently been used 
to perpetuate the dominant political, economic, or social position of certain 
hrroups' hut these concerns should not arise where the dominant group 
grants preferences to white women or racial minorities (Sandalow, 1975: 664 
n :15, n68). Yet, as prPviously noted, opponents of racial preferences argue 
that pn~ferPncps art> non-egalitarian. 
There is a difference, for example, between laws granting racial 
preferences in admission to higher education and earlier laws prohibiting 
the admission of blacks to colleges and universities. Even a conservative 
federal judge like Hichard Posner would agree that these situations are 
different. Judge Posner would argue, however, that courts should ignore 
these differences (Sandalow, 1975: 676-9). He and other racial conservatives 
claim that legal equality can be achieve only if law is truly colourblind. A 
rigid colourhlind rule, however, produces undesirable outcomes or con-
sequl'nces in a society like the United States which admits its history of past 
discrimination and continuing 'societal' discrimination. Under these 
circumstances, ignoring continuing racial inequalities implicitly condones 
racial discrimination. Given this history, the diversity rationale for racial 
preferences seem>. a necessary step to achieve racial justice. 
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Diversity 
Legal origins of diversity 
The notion of diversity as a justification for racial preferences in the context 
of higher education first appeared in DeFunis v Odegaard (1974) the earliest 
reverse discrimination suit involving professional higher education to reach 
the United States Supreme Court A limited version of the diversity model 
was suggested by Justice William Douglas. In DeFunis the court refused to 
address directly whether racial preferences are ever permissible, ruling 
instead that the matter was moot since the petitioner, Marco DeFunis, Jr, 
would complete his legal education even if he lost. Dissenting, Justice 
Douglas wrote: 
The introduction of race as a measure of an applicant's qualification normally 
introduces a capricious and irrelevant factor working an invidious 
discrimination. Once race is a starting point educators and courts are 
immediately embroiled in competing claims of different racial and ethnic 
groups that would make difficult, manageable standards consistent with the 
Equal Protection Clause. 'The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to eliminate all official State sources of invidious racial 
discrimination in the States.' The Law School's admissions policy cannot be 
reconciled with that purpose, unless cultural standards of a diverse rather 
than a homogeneous socie~y are taken into account . ... The key to the problem 
is the consideration of each applicant in a racially neutral way. (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added) (333-4). 
By 1974 it seemed apparent, at least to Justice Douglas, that the direction 
of Supreme Court jurisprudence weighed against the use of racial 
preferences for remedial purposes, unless, as Justice Douglas suggests, 
cultural standards of a diverse rather than a homogeneous society are taken 
into account. 
Justice William Powell picked up on Justice Douglas' language in Bakke 
v Regents of the University of California ( 1978). Like DeFunis, the plaintiff 
in Bakke, a white male, claimed that minority applicants to medical school 
with bench mark scores lower than his were admitted both years he was 
rejected. These bench mark scores relied more heavily on quantitative 
measures like standardised test scores and grade point averages than 
subjective measures like interview evaluations and letters of recom-
mendation. The University of California at Davis (hereinafter UC-Davis), 
the defendant in Bakke, never addressed the reliability of these measures, 
particularly as applied to minority applicants (Lawrence, 1976). Instead, the 
school created a special admissions program to increase the number of 
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'disadvantaged' students in each entering class." The University's short-term 
goal was to increase diversity among its student body. Its long-term goal 
was to stimulate interest in health professions among students from 
disadvantaged communities. 
Justice Blackmun in a separate opinion in Bakke argued for a society in 
which race is irrelevant, but acknowledged that to reach this point race 
must be taken into account. He saw racial preferences as temporary and 
racial irrelevancy as the ultimate goal. This and other language in Bakke led 
to discussions about compensatory measures which often conflate tra-
ditional affirmative action, compensation for past or continuing intentional 
discrimination, with the concept of diversity, the vision ofhow a pluralistic 
society ought to look. Arguably, the rationale for each is different. 
Positive diversity 
Recently critical race theorists and other scholars have set out another 
theoretical basis for racial preferences, namely that the presence of racial 
and ethnic diversity within the academy and workplace is a necessary 
component to a just society. In fact, a racially and ethnically diverse 
environment reflects the larger society and promotes a more representative 
and enriched sense of community. Advocates of positive diversity reject a 
formal approach to equal protection of the laws in favour of a conception of 
substantive equality, which focuses not on equal or same treatment but on 
equal power between inevitably diverse groups. The proposition is that true 
equal protection under the laws consists of equivalent relationships between 
two or more clearly separate entities, each of which possesses its own 
identity. 
Only in the higher education cases has the court taken an approach 
anything like the idea of substantive equality. Justice Powell in Bakke (at 
2749) acknowledged that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
intended the equal protection clause to 'function as bridging the vast 
distance between members of the Negro [sic] race and the white majority' 
but relied instead on the 'universal terms' of the amendment. He rejected 
the Regents' claim that discrimination against the white majority is suspect 
even if its purpose is benign. While racial preferences could not be used by 
a State university to remedy societal discrimination- the legacy of racial 
apartheid- Justice Powell reasoned that race could be used as one of many 
factors when making admissions decisions. The permissible goal, he said, 
was the university's interest in a diverse student body. Today, as mentioned 
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earlier, even this rationale is under attack in federal courts as evidenced by 
the Podberesky and Hopwood decisions. 
The diversity concept has been attacked in the States as well. In March 
1995, shortly after the Adarand decision, University of Californi~ system 
president, JW Peltason justified the need for positive diversity saymg that: 
[A]s the public university of our nation's n:tost_ racially and ethnically ?ive~se 
mainland State, the University has an obligation to encomp~ss that d~vers~ty 
in its student body, its faculty, and its staff. What happens m our U~1Vers1ty 
campuses will have much to do with our ability to forge an e~ergmg new 
culture, a culture that is inclusive, varied, and respectful of difference, but 
which also unites us into a community that can live, work, pros~er, ~n.d 
flourish in our Constitutional democracy. It may well threaten Cahforma s 
social and economic future if we make it harder for mn:wnt:y and 
disadvantaged people to learn or work in the University of Cahfo~ma and 
other institutions of higher education in this State (quoted m Morns, 1996: 
187). 
Unpersuaded, the University of California Board of Re~ents v~t~d, ~o 
prohibit the use of'race, religion, sex, color, ethnicity, or natwna_l on~n m 
admissions, employment or contracting decisions at the Umvers1ty of 
California's nine public campuses (Morris, 1996: 186). The consequences of 
the Board's actions were swift, especially in the system's most competitive 
professional schools. The number of black applicants admitted to U?-
Berkeley's law school, dropped almost 90 per cent from 75 in 1996 to 14m 
the 1997, the first year racial preferences were not used (Rabkin,_1997: 63). 
In 1997 UCLA law school admitted 80 per cent fewer black apphcants and 
35 per cent fewer Latino applicants (Savage, 1997: A1). 
The State's public medical schools also reported a decline in both 
applications and admissions that started in 1996, the year after the ~ege~t's 
decision but before its implementation. In 1994 when the natwnw1de 
number of students from racial and ethnic minorities in medical schools 
peaked, four of the five University of California schools ranked among the 
top eight schools producing minority doctors. By 1997 two of the five 
California public medical schools had no Black entering students. The UC 
medical schools saw a 22 per cent drop in minority applicants compared to 
a 14 per cent decline nationwide. Some University officials speculate that 
fewer racial and ethnic minorities are applying to the UC schools because 
they perceive the Regent's policy as signalling a less supportive environment 
for minorities within these schools (Burdman, 1997). 
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Interestingly, some opponents of affirmative action seem unconcerned 
about the potential return to the virtual exclusion of some racial and ethnic 
minorities from higher education, especially at the most elitist schools. They 
believe 'the change reflects a return of fairness to the university' (emphasis 
added) (Burdman, 1997). Yet, these same individuals would be less 
accepting of a co-educational university where the 'neutral' admissions or 
hiring policies resulted in an overwhelmingly male university. The reason 
for this tolerance of racial but not gender segregation in a racially and 
ethnically diverse country goes unexamined in the public debates over 
affirmative action. 
Opponents of affirmative action also argue that true social justice occurs 
only where race and ethnicity are irrelevant. As US Supreme Court Justice 
Antoin Scalia wrote in a separate opinion in Adarand, '[i]n the eyes of 
government, we are just one race here. It is American' (at 2118). These 
proponents of colourblindness argue that: 
fW]hen we hand out society's goodies based on merit and achievement, we 
should examine just those yard sticks which measure merit and achievement. 
... it doesn't really matter that much how many of any racial or ethnic group 
is in an entering class, just that your pick the ... most qualified students' (Suarez, 1997: 7). 
The diversity concept that had been used by colleges and universities in 
justifying race-conscious efforts in admissions and faculty hiring grows out 
of the Supreme Court's ruling in Bakke. But now the validity of this modest 
goal has been questioned by a federal appellate court in Hopwood v Texas 
(1996). That court reasoned that racial diversity in higher education is not 
a compelling governmental interest and is inconsistent with the concept of 
colourblind or 'merit-based' admissions criteria. Merit, however, like 
equality, is always relative and contextual. 
Colourblindness or Merit Model 
The reference today to colourblind laws comes from Justice John Harlan's 
dissenting opinion in Plessy and those now famous words, '[t]here is no caste 
here. Our Constitution is colourblind' (at 559). These words standing alone 
indicate the innate equality of all races, but Justice Harlan knew that the 
Jim Crow practices of whites were based on a belief in black inferiority. In 
essence, he agreed with the majority in Plessy that blacks were not, and 
probably never would be, the social equals of whites. But he also saw more 
harm than good in legitimising State laws mandating racial segregation. 
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Harlan believed that blacks should be treated the same under law - they 
should enjoy formal equality. 
Justice Harlan's notion of colourblindness or merit is used by both white 
racial conservatives and working class whites, but for different reasons. 
Most racial conservatives fully understand the context in which Justice 
Harlan used the term colourblindness in Plessy and the inappropriateness 
of the term today. The formal equality Justice Harlan intended is far 
different from the substantive equality denied blacks and Latinos/a~ ~y 
cases like Hopwood and Podberesky. Today this colourblind rhe~onc _Is 
invoked to resist efforts to dismantle a system of privilege based pnmanly 
on race, not to guarantee blacks equal treatment. 
The plaintiffs in DeFunis, Bakke, and Hopwood, all work~ng_ class 
whites, argued that 'merit' and not race should govern admissiOn to 
professional education. They, along with racial conservat~ves, conten~ ~hat 
colourblind, and thus 'neutral' criteria, epitomise ment-based deciSI~n­
making by institutions of higher learning. The _validity of no~-:acial 
admission criteria like alumni preferences to applicants from pnvile~ed 
backgrounds, standardised test scores and undergra_duat~ grade pomt 
averages are not examined for racial bias. Also unexammed IS whether the 
so-called 'merit-based' criterion identifies the students who can best serve 
the nation. 
An increasingly conservative federal court unquestioningly a~cepts 
claims of white plaintiffs that selection criteria other than race ~re ~ah~ and 
non-discriminatory. In addition, colleges and universities, the_ mstlt~tw~al 
defendants in these reverse discrimination cases, are not reqmred to JUStify 
their heavy reliance on quantitative measures like the Law School 
Admissions Test (LSAT) or Medical College Admissions Test (MCA~).and 
undergraduate grade point average (UGPA) in making admissions d~ciSIO~s. 
The consideration of race by these institutions, in an attempt to diversify 
faculties and student bodies, is recent, 111 and the extent of institutional 
commitment to diversifying their communities is often questionable. The~e 
previously overwhelmingly white institutions have a vested inter~st m 
preserving 'neutral' admission criteria which disadvantages non-whites. 
In the key cases challenging affirmative action efforts in higher 
education, the real parties of interest, blacks and other students of colour, 
had no voice in structuring the universities' defence. Therefore, the 
underlying assumption of the conservatives' attack, that removing race 
makes the current admissions criteria neutral and thus fair, was never 
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challenged. Instead, the courts in DeFunis, Bakke, and Hopwood were 
swayed by plaintiffs' arguments that quantitative measures like 
standardised tests and UGPA are neutral and thus fair determinants of 
admissibility. The institutional defendants were never required to explain 
or justify all their admissions criteria, nor admission goals. 
Justice William 0 Douglas, dissenting in DeFunis, questioned the 
validity of the LSAT and undergraduate grade point averages (GPA) as 
predicters of success in law school, noting that neither Marco DeFunis Jr 
nor the University of Washington challenged the validity of these admission 
criteria. DeFunis simply claimed that his quantitative scores were as good 
as or better than minority applicants admitted by the law school. The 
University of Washington defended their admissions process based on the 
assumption that the LSAT score and UGPA (bench mark scores) were valid 
predictors of success in law school. 
Allan Bakke made a similar claim, namely that minority applicants with 
benchmark scores lower than his were admitted both years he was rejected. 
These bench mark scores relied more heavily on quantitative measures like 
standardised test scores and grade point averages than subjective measures 
like interview evaluations and letters of recommendation. The University 
of California at Davis (hereinafter UC-Davis), the defendant in Bakke, never 
addressed the reliability of these measures, particularly as they applied to 
minority applicants (Lawrence, 1976). 
Allan Bakke's claim that he was 'better qualified' because he had a 
higher numeral index than some minority applicants who were admitted 
went unchallenged. Charles Lawrence (1976: 4) points out that in Bakke the 
minority community lacked the legal resources to mount a defence and 
naively believed that UC-Davis would vigorously defend its admissions 
program. According to Professor Lawrence, potential minority interveners 
'would have demonstrated that the Medical School has not one but many 
"standards" by which it measures candidates whom it has already adjudged 
minimally qualified'. This approach, however, would call into question the 
heavy reliance on quantitative measures like standardised tests and grades. 
If quantitative measures cannot be used as the sole or primary measure of 
admissibility, then colleges and universities might look to other more 
individualised, and subjective measures to determine who, among many 
qualified applicants, should be given one of the limited number of seats. 
Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson's extensive and widely praised study 
of black undergraduate students points out the ways in which racism affects 
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blacks measured performance on academic tests (Steele and Aronson, 1995). 
They argue that persistent and widely held negative soci~tal stereoty~es 
about blacks' intellectual ability and competence have a social~p~ycholog1cal 
impact on black's performance on standardised tests. While It IS true t~at 
blacks often have lower standardised test scores than other entenng 
students, some studies suggest these tests are flawed when use~ as the 
primary predictors of performance (Steele and Aronson 1995; Wightm_an 
1996). Further, Steele and Aronson argue that many black students with 
high quantitative predictors underperform as o~ten as blac~ st~dents 
admitted with weaker credentials because of the social-psychological Impact 
of the racial stereotypes attached to these students. Black students know 
that the stereotypes about them raise questions about their intellectual 
ability and they may grow weary of fending off what Steele and Aronson 
call 's~reotype vulnerability'. Even when they do not believe the ste:eotype, 
'stereotype vulnerability' can cost black students many pomts on 
standardised exams. 
Steele and others challenge critics who claim that affirmative action in 
higher education displaces qualified white applicants. Steele fo~~d that at 
the undergraduate level this occurs only in elite colleges compnsi~g 15 per 
cent of all four-year colleges in the United States. There was no evidence of 
preference in admissions among the rest. Steele concludes that '[o]verall, 
affirmative action causes little displacement of other students -less by far 
than other forms of preferences, like the one for children of alumni' (Ste~le, 
1995: A25). As stated previously, in reality compensatory efforts hke 
affirmative action displace few whites, whereas the absence of such 
programs in colleges and universities works against blacks and other non-
white students. 
In DeFunis and Bakke the minority community failed to act swiftly and 
intervene in those reverse discrimination lawsuits. In contrast, the 
Thurgood Marshall Legal Society and the Black Pre-law Associat~on s~ught 
unsuccessfully to intervene in Hopwood alleging that the Umversity_ of 
Texas could not adequately protect their interests. 11 The trial court demed 
their request, saying that the objective of both the law school and the 
interveners was the same, viz preservation of the status quo. 
On appeal both organisations attempted to intervene again, ar~ing 
that the law school failed to assert one of their proposed defences, VIZ t~e 
legality of the Texas Index12 under Title VI. The appellate court demed their 
request, discounting the fact that both organisations were prevented from 
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introducing evidence to support their claim that the Texas Index 'by itself 
was an unlawful basis for admissions decisions'. 13 Instead, the court re-
peated the conclusion of the earlier appellate opinion that 'the interests of 
the associations were adequately represented by the law school and the 
State, and ... as a practical matter, disposition in the principal suit would 
not impair or impede either of those groups' interests' (Hopwood, 1996: 961). 
Evidentially, the real possibility of a dramatic decrease in the number of 
black and Latino/a students admitted to subsequent law classes was not 
considered an impairment of the groups' interests. So even where the 
minority community acts in a timely fashion to intervene, the courts assist 
the plaintiffs in framing the issues in ways that deny the affected parties, 
the beneficiaries of the schools' programs, from having a voice in shaping the 
issues presented by the lawsuit. In many respects courts today ignore racial 
inequalities much as did the Supreme Court in Plessy one hundred years 
ago. 
Calls for Reform 
Given the Supreme Court's reluctance to deviate from an approach offormal 
equality to race-based discrimination, few options remain for those who seek 
to preserve racial diversity in higher education. Increasingly, both sup-
porters and critics contend that affirmative action is dead. Some 
pragmatists call for non-racial measures like college lotteries as a means of 
protecting educational opportunities for non-whites (Guinier, 1997). On the 
other hand, some optimists argue for expanding affirmative action using a 
substantive equality approach that focuses on equal outcomes or results 
(Lawrence and Matsuda, 1997). As the entering classes at Texas and 
California colleges and universities become whiter, the future of affirmative 
action is unclear. A few liberals have sounded the alarm, but much of the 
public seems unconcerned (Lewis, 1997). 
Access to higher education was a mechanism used by civil rights lawyers 
like Thurgood Marshall to dismantle de jure racial discrimination (Missouri 
ex rei Gaines, 1938; McLaurin v Oklahoma, 1950; and Sweatt v Painter, 
1950). Even after, the Brown (1954) decision many southern colleges 
actively resisted admitting black students and other colleges across the 
nation passively continued as white-only institutions. Today, more than 40 
years after Brown, the States of Mississippi and Louisiana remain under · 
court order to complete dismantling segregated public colleges and 
universities. 
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Brown v Board of Education built on a series of legal cases attacking the 
total exclusion of blacks from colleges and universities across the nation. 
Ironically, today conservatives use Brown to advance a colourblind 
argument that will deny many blacks meaningful access to higher 
education. While some southern States persist in resisting efforts to 
desegregate their institutions of higher learning, white plaintiffs attack 
affirmative programs designed to increase minority enrolment at other 
institutions. 
Rather than appreciate this irony, today US courts tend to narrow the 
situations where the equal protection clause would allow race-conscious 
compensatory measures. The consequences, most commentators concede, is 
that colleges and universities will become less racially diverse, and the 
educational gap between whites and blacks in particular will increase, a 
situation tolerated under the current interpretation of the equal protection 
clause. There is ample evidence that the law does not dictate this result. The 
acceptance by courts, legislative bodies and the general public of white 
feminists' arguments about the different perspective the presence of women 
bring to educational institutions and the workplace, illustrates that the 
diversity rationale can work in the United States. The rejection of the 
diversity rationale when applied to racial and ethnic minorities suggests a 
continuing resistance to compensatory justice for non-white racially 
subordinated groups. 
Conclusion 
The traditional concept of affirmative action as compensation for past or 
continuing racial discrimination has been rejected by a substantial portion 
of the general public. In fact, racial conservatives have used the same argu-
ments advanced by racially subordinated groups to undermine these efforts 
to secure racial justice. Justifying racial preferences as a compensatory 
measure to counter past or continuing discrimination belies the depth of 
racial discrimination in the United States. Compensatory racial preferences 
suggest short-term or temporary remedies. This understanding of 
affirmative action has been used by racial conservatives to undermine the 
legal viability of this concept. Therefore, positive diversity, \\'hich is an 
affirmative celebration of difference as an important component of society, 
seems a better approach to achieving compensatory justice for racial and 
ethnic minorities. Thus diversity as a rationale for racial preferences needs 
to be separated from affirmative action. It is possible that the diversity 
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rationale will be accepted under the current legal regime, but limited to the 
educational context because education has 'such a dramatic effect on one's 
life' (Cosner. 1996: 1024). Granted that education provides access to the 
tools for economic sufficiency, this still does not necessarily translate into 
employment. Therefore, in its present form the diversity rationale will be 
another short-term approach to the problem of racial injustice in the United 
States. 
Given the United States' long history of racial discrimination, especially 
against blacks, it would be a tragic mistake to require racial and ethnic 
diversity in educational institutions but not the workplace or economic 
sphere. Under this approach it is possible for a racially diverse student body 
to be taught by an overwhelmingly white professorate. Meaningful 
compensatory justice in the United States requires that both the educational 
and employment environments reflect values and perspectives of all groups 
that comprise the nation. Thus, alternative legal theories need to be 
developed to expand the dominant ideology. 
Social justice theories developed under the current legal regime will be 
temporary measures easily capable of being undermined in the way reverse 
discrimination suits undermined efforts to obtain social justice for white 
women and racially subordinated groups in the United States. Thus, social 
justice theory must be constantly evolving to avoid co-optation by racial 
conservatives. Ultimately, whether the United States has achieved racial 
justice will be measured by the presence or absence of economic and social 
conditions like residential, educational, and employment segregation, race 
and gender discrimination, and poverty. 
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I will use the terms Black and African American interchangeably throughout 
this essay to denote persons of African ancestry. 
I put the term 'racial minorities' in quotations to remind the reader that race 
is a social rather than scientific classification. 
The Supreme Court in several cases, primarily between the 1940s and mid-
1960s used the State action doctrine to reach some forms of private 
discrimination that had a public character. See, for example, Marsh v Alabama 
(1946) (company owned town); Shelly v Kraemer (1948) (racially restrictive 
covenants); and Burton v Wilmington Parking Authority (1961) (restaurant in 
city-owned parking facility). In addition, Congress used its power to regulate 
interstate commerce to reach some forms of non-governmental discrimination. 
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See, for example, Heart of Atlanta Motel v United States (1964); Katzenbach v 
McClung (1964) (upholding the public accommodation section of the Civil 
Rights Act 1964 (US)). 
4. The terms communities of colour and people of colour are used by critical race 
scholars in the United States to denote non-white subordinated racial and 
ethnic groups like blacks, Asians, Latinos/as as well as indigenous peoples like 
American Indians and Hawaiians. 
5. 'Thus, we are not faced with the question of whether States can provide 
"separate but equal" undergraduate institutions for males and females': United 
States v Virginia (1996: 533 n 7). 
6. Turning a blind eye to this reality, some jurists and scholars attribute the 
continued disparity between black and white in the United States to a 'culture 
of poverty' (Dinesh D'Souza, 1995). It is not racism they argue, but a 
dysfunctional minority culture that creates the disparities. 
7. Executive Order No 11,246, 3 CFR 339 (1964-1965). 
8. Professor Lawrence and Matsuda cite several convincing examples. San 
Francisco Fire Department which in 1978 had no women now has 70. Today 
women receive 36.8 per cent of all PhDs awarded in the United States compare 
to 14.4 per cent in 1971. Fifty per cent of the Fortune 500 companies now have 
at least one woman board member (Lawrence and Matsuda: 152-3). 
9. Non-whites were not automatically considered 'disadvantaged' but had to come 
from economically or educationally disadvantaged backgrounds. 
10. For example, Texas openly denied admission to any black applicant until 1950: 
Sweatt v Painter (1950) (held that a separate State law school for blacks was 
not 'equal' to the law school at the University of Texas). 
11. Hopwood: 959. Initially, both organisations attempted to intervene before trial, 
but were denied by the District Court and that decision was affirmed by the 
Court of Appeals: Hopwood v Texas (1994) (per curia). 
12. Texas Index (TI) is a composite of the LSAT and GPA. The University of Texas 
relies heavily on the TI, a quantitative measure, in determining who to admit. 
An applicant's index is used for ranking purposes (Hopwood at 935). 
13. The appellate court said that an earlier appellate court panel had considered 
and rejected the potential 'divergence of interests'. According to the court, the 
trial judge allowed the interveners to remain involved in the case throughout, 
acting as amici curiae. The trial judge also allowed both organisations to submit 
information for the record. 
References 
Bickel, AM (1955) 'The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision' 69 
Harvard Law Review 1. 
Brown-Scott, W ( 1994) 'Race Consciousness In Higher Education: Does "Sound 
Education Policy" Support the Continued Existence of Historically Black 
Colleges?' 43 Emory Law Journal 1. 
Burdman, P (1997) '2 UC Medical Incoming Classes Have No Blacks' San Francisco 
Chronicle 1 August: Al. 
Condit, CM and JL Lucaites (1993) Crafting Equality: America's Anglo-African 
World Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Cosner, KL (1996) 'Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Lessons and Directions 
from the Supreme Court' 71 Indiana Law Journal 1003. 
LAW IN CONTEXT 
Crenshaw, KW (198H) :Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
, LegitimatiOn m Antidiscrimination Law' 101 Harvard Law Review 1331. 
D So~za, D (1995) The End of Racism: Principles for a Multiracial Society New York-
Free Press. · · 
Ezorsky, G (19~1) Racism and Justice: The Case for Affirmative Action Ithaca· 
Cornell Umvers1ty Press. · 
Freeman, A ( l cn_R) 'Legiti~1izing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination 
Law: A CntJcal Rev1ew of Supreme Court Doctrine' 62 Minnesota Law R · 1049. ev~ew 
Frederickson, GM (1971) The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-
. Amencan C~aracter and Destiny, 1817-1914 New York: Harper and Row. 
Fned, C (1990) Metro Broadcasting, Inc v FCC: Two Concepts of Equality' 104 
Harvard Law Remew 107. 
Gossett, TF (1963) Race: The History of an Idea in America New York: Schocken 
Books. 
Guiner, L (1997) 'The Real Bias in Higher Education' New York Times 24 June A19 Jone~, JE (1985) 'The Genesis and Present Status of Affirmative Action i~ 
Employment; Economi_c Legal, and Political Realities' 70 Iowa Law Review 901. 
Jones, JE (1988) The Ongins of Affirmative Action' 21 UC-Davis Law Review 383 
Kahlenberg, RD, (1996) 'Getting Beyond Racial Preferences: The Class-Based 
Compromise 45 Amencan University Law Review 721, 724. 
Lawrence,~ 0~~6) When the Defendants Are Foxes Too: The Need for Intervention 
By MmontJes In 'Reverse Discrimination' Suits Like Bakke' 34 Guild 
Practttwner 1. 
Lawrence, CR III (1987l,"The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscwus Racism 39 Stanford Law Review 317. 
Lawrence, C. and MJ Matsuda (1997) We Won't Go Back: Making the Case for 
~ffirmatwe Actwn New York: Houghton Miffiin Co. 
L?wis, A (1977) 'Whiter Than White,' New York Times, 23 May: A31. 
Litwac~, L (1961) N?rth of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790-1860 
Chicago: Umversity Chicago Press. 
Morris, K (1996) Through the Looking Glass: Recent Developments in Affirmative 
Actwn 11 Berkeley Women's Law Journal 182 
Morrison, JE (1994) 'Colorblindness, Individuality·, and Merit: An Analysis of the 
Rhetonc Agamst Affirmative Action' 79 Iowa Law Review 313. 
Rabkm, J (1997) 'Diversity Snobs' American Spectator August: 63. 
Sandalow, T (1975) 'Racial, P;eferences. in Higher Education: Political Responsibility 
and the Judicial Role 42 lTnwerszty of Chicago Law Review 653. 
Savage, DG (1997) 'UC Affirmative Action Halt May Clash With US Law' Los 
Angeles Tzmes, 26 July: Al. 
Steele, C M (1995) 'Black Students Live Down to Expectations,' New York Times, 31 
August: A25. 
Steele, CM and J Aronson (1995) 'Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test 
Performance of Afncan Americans' 69 Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 797. 
Suarez, R (1997) 'Talk of the Nation: Affirmative Action' National Public Radio 26 
August [transcript]. ' 
Tussman and TenBroek (1949) 'The Equal Protection of the Laws,' 37 California 
Law Revtew 341. 
Wightman,. L ( 1997) 'The Threat To Diversity In Legal Education: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race As A Factor In Law School 
Admissions Decisions' 72 New York University Law Review 1. 
134 
EQUALITY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND DIVERSITY IN THE USA 
Westen P (1982) The Empty Idea Of Equality 95 Harvard Law Review 537. Waldro~, J (1991) 'The Substance of Equality' 89 Michigan Law Review 1350 
(Review essay of Peter Westen's Speaking of Equality: An Analysis of the 
Rhetorical Force of 'Equality' In Moral and Legal Discourse). 
Cases and Statutes 
US Constitution 14th Amendments 1 (1868). 
Adarand Constructors v Pena 115 S Ct 2097 (1995) . 
Bakke v Regents of the University of California, 438 US 265 (1978). 
Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497 (1954). 
Bradwell v Illinois, 86 US (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). 
Brown v Board of Education, 349 US 294 (1954). 
Burton v Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 US 715 (1961). 
City of Richmond v Croson, 488 US 469 (1989). 
DeFunis v Odegaard, 416 US 312 (1974). 
Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 US 448 (1980). 
Fronterio v Richardson, 411 US 677 (1973) (applying equal protection class to 
classifications based on sex 'inherently suspect') modified by Craig v Boren, 429 
US 190 (1976) (adopting 'a middle-tier approach'). 
Geduldig v Aiello, 417 US 484 (1974). 
Goesaert v Clearly, 335 US 464 (1948) (upholding a State statute prohibiting women 
from working as bartenders unless the wife or daughter of the owner). 
Heart of Atlanta Motel v United States, a79 US 189 (1964). 
Hopwood v Texas, 21 F 3d 603 (5th Cir 1994). 
Hopwood v Texas, 78 F 3d 932 (5th Cir 1996), cert denied, 135 LEd 1094 (1997). 
Hoyt v Florida, 368 US 57 (1961) (upholding State statute granting women, but not 
men an automatic exemption from jury duty). 
Katzenbach v McClung, 379 US 377 (1964). 
Marsh v Alabama, 326 US 501 (1946). 
McLaurin v Oklahoma State Regents, 339 US 737 ( 1950). 
Metro Broadcasting v Federal Communications Commission, 497 US 547 (1990). 
Michael M v Superior Court, 450 US 464 (1981) (upholding a State statutory rape 
law which only punished men who had sexual intercourse with under-age 
women). 
Mississippi College for Women v Hogan, 458 US 718 (1982). 
Missouri ex rei Gaines v Canada, 305 US 337 (1938). 
Muller v Oregon, 208 US 412 (1908) (upholding a state statute prohibiting the 
'employment women in any mechanical establishment, or factory or laundry for 
more than ten hours a day'). 
Plessy v Ferguson, 163 US 537 ( 1896). 
Podberesky v Kirwan, 38 F 3d 52 (4th Cir 1994), cert denied, 131 LEd. 1002 (1995). 
Rostker v Goldberg, 429 US 57 (1981) (upholding federal draft law which exempted 
women). 
Shelly v Kraemer 334 US 1 (1948) 
Sweatt v Painter 339 US 629 (1950). 
United States v Virginia 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). 
Washington v Davis 426 US 229 (1976). 
Wygant v Jackson Board of Education 476 US 267 (1986). 
135 
